were looking for a full debate between Golove and myself over the scope of the treaty power are likely to be disappointed. Golove's arti cle, even with its historical discussion, largely fails to engage my cri tique of the nationalist view.
In this reply, I will make four points. First, despite claiming to do so, Golove's article does not in fact defend the nationalist view that I critiqued. Second, Golove's proposed subject matter limitation on the treaty power reflects a false assumption about the views of other for eign affairs scholars and, more importantly, lacks any meaningful con tent. Third, Golove purports to accept the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions as a baseline, but much of his analysis is inconsis tent with those decisions. Finally, Golove's historical discussion, while rich in detail, is both methodologically inconsistent and tendentious.
I. THE "NATIONALIST VIEW" OF THE TREATY POWER
In my original article, I coined the term "nationalist view" to refer to the proposition that the treaty power is limited neither by subject matter nor by the reserved powers and rights of the states.4 The fol lowing statement by Professor Lori Damrosch reflects the view I had in mind: "[T]he treaty-makers may make supreme law binding on the states as to any subject, and notions of states' rights should not be as serted as impediments to the fu ll implementation of treaty obliga tions."5 One of the central claims of my article was that the two ele ments to the nationalist view -the lack of a subject matter limitation and the lack of states' rights limitations -had developed largely in isolation but were now being combined in academic commentary and in the Restatement (Third).6 If accepted together, I argued, these two elements of the nationalist view would give the treatymakers essen tially unlimited power vis-a-vis the states. I criticized this view as in consistent with constitutional text and structure, as well as with the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions.
The principal significance of the nationalist view is that it would allow the treatymakers the ability to circumvent federalism limitations otherwise applicable to the national government's exercise of law making power. Some commentators have suggested, for example, that Congress could reenact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act -4. Bradley, supra note 1, at 393. (Vol. 99:98 which was invalidated by the Supreme Court on the ground that it ex ceeded Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment7 -as an implementation of an existing treaty commitment.8 Similarly, in a re cent case involving the Violence Against Women Act, a group of in ternational law scholars filed an arnicus curiae brief arguing that, even if the statute exceeded Congress's powers (as the Supreme Court ul timately concluded), it should be upheld as a valid implementation of a treaty.9 Commentators also have argued that the treatymakers have the ability to "commandeer" state legislatures and executive officials, notwithstanding Supreme Court decisions disallowing Congress from doing so. 10 At the end of my article, I considered various constructions of the treaty power that might reconcile the need for flexibility in interna tional negotiations with the structural principles of American federal ism. The best contemporary construction, I argued, was one that would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any subject but would limit their ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress's power to do so. This construction would give the treatymakers substantial power to create supreme federal law, while at the same time preventing an end run around the federalism limitations applicable to Congress's creation of such law.11 As I ac knowledged, my proposed construction would probably require the limiting or overruling of the Supreme Court's 1920 decision, Missouri v. Holland,12 which upheld the statutory implementation of a migra tory birds treaty even though the statute may have been beyond Con gress's legislative powers at that time.
Throughout his article, Golove describes himself as defending the "nationalist view" against my critique.13 In fact, the view that he de fends is, in many respects, narrower than the one I critiqued. Contrary to the conventional academic wisdom that I criticized, Golove accepts the possibility that much of the Supreme Court's recent federalism ju risprudence applies to limit the treaty power, and he also purports to accept a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. The only limi tation that Golove specifically argues against is one that would restrict the ability of the treatymakers to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress's power to do so. In other words, Golove seeks only to defend a narrow version of the Court's holding in Holland. Conse quently, his article is not a defense of the nationalist view that I cri tiqued, but rather is a response to the particular construction of the treaty power I proposed at the end of my article.
Golove begins by acknowledging that "treaties, like all other gov ernmental acts, are subject to the Constitution" and that treaties that violated specific constitutional prohibitions would be unconstitu tional.14 I would certainly agree, although there is some sweeping lan guage in Holland that could be read to the contrary.15 Next, Golove accepts the proposition that treaties are "in principle subject to the separation of powers restrictions which are applicable to ordinary acts of Congress."16 Again I agree, although Golove does not adequately distinguish the treaty power's relationship to separation of powers from its relationship to federalism.17 12. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
13. See, e.g. , Golove, supra note 2, at 1080 ("In Part I, I set out the basic textual and structural arguments that support the nationalist view."). Occasionally, including in the title of his article, Golove refers to the "nationalist conception." He appears to treat that phrase as synonymous with "nationalist view." 14. Id. at 1083.
15. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 ("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention."); see also Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-20, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1920) (noting that the Court's "hint that there may be no other test to be applied than whether the treaty has been duly concluded indicates that the Court might hold that specific constitu tional limitations in favor of individual liberty and property are not applicable to depriva tions wrought by treaties"). Some of the concerns regarding this language were resolved in Reid v. Coven, in which a plurality of the Court stated that, notwithstanding Holland, the treaty power was limited by the individual rights protections in the Bill of Rights. 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) .
16. Golove, supra note 2, at 1084.
Golove contends that "
[n]othing in the constitutional text suggests that treaties are free of the requirements of the separation of powers," Golove, supra note 2, at 1098 n.53, [Vol. 99:98 Most surprisingly, given some of the rhetoric in his article, Golove accepts that "treaties are not immune from federalism limitations."18 He states, for example, that "[t]reaties have no general license to vio late the immunities of states any more than they may violate the rights of individuals. "19 Within such potential federalism limitations, he in cludes subj ect matter limitations, the doctrine of state sovereign im munity, and the Supreme Court's recent anti-commandeering limita tions. In other words, Golove accepts the possibility that much of the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence applies to limit the treaty power. Apparently, the only aspect of the Supreme Court's fed eralism jurisprudence that Golove does not believe applies to the treaty power are the Court's decisions concerning the subject matter scope of Congress's powers under Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment.20 At this point, Golove has, perhaps unintentionally, dis tanced himself from the views of many other commentators concern ing the implications of Holland.21
but that is also true of the requirements of federalism. The text provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land and that states may not enter into treaties, but it does not provide that there are no federalism limits on the scope of the treaty power. Golove further argues that separation of powers principles are different because they "do not limit the subject mat ter or content of treaties," but rather "only require that certain subject matters not be regu lated in certain ways .... " Id. at 1097 n.53. To the extent I understand this distinction, it ap pears to be inaccurate. If separation of powers limitations apply to the treaty power, they prevent treaties from making certain domestic changes (such as the creation of domestic criminal law or the appropriation of money) without the involvement of the House of Rep resentatives. See 20. Golove argues that these decisions are different from the other federalism decisions because they concern only lack of power, not "affirmative constitutional immunities of states." Id. at 1087. Golove makes a similar distinction in an effort to explain the Supreme Court's use in the nineteenth century of the "equal footing" doctrine to limit the treaty power. Id. at 1231 n.519. As discussed below, Golove's formalistic distinction, which he never defends, appears to be at odds with recent Supreme Court decisions. See Holland is reconsidered, it appears that there are no limits on the treaty power grounded in state sovereignty.").
I certainly welcome Golove's partial repudiation of what I have called the "nationalist view." Unfortunately, Golove repeatedly de scribes his article as if it were presenting a full-fledged defense of that view, which makes his article potentially confusing. For example, he cites scholars and officials as supporting the "nationalist view" when they in fact (at most) supported only one component of it (usually the lack of states' rights limitations).22 Similarly, he asserts that the Su preme Court has endorsed the nationalist view,23 even though he ac knowledges elsewhere that the Court has never held that the treaty power is free from subj ect matter limitations -and, indeed, that it has suggested just the opposite.
A good illustration of how Golove's use of the term "nationalist view" can be confusing is his treatment of the views of the nineteenth century statesman, John Calhoun. Golove relies heavily on statements by Calhoun that suggest the absence of reserved power limitations on the treaty power and argues that these statements show that "Calhoun seems to have accepted the nationalist view of the treaty power."24 Golove does not mention, however, that Calhoun believed in a strong subject matter limitation on the treaty power. In Calhoun's view, the treaty power was to be "strictly limited to questions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation to adjust them."25 To extend the treaty power beyond such truly inter national matters, he said, "would be to extend it beyond its allotted sphere; and, thus, a palpable violation of the constitution."26 By con trast, as long as the treaty power was limited to its proper subject mat ter, Calhoun believed, the treaty power would not unduly threaten the states' reserved powers. Indeed, in his view, the treaty power had rarely, if ever, been used to regulate in areas reserved to the states. 211 (1990) ("From the beginning and throughout the whole existence of the Federal Government (the treaty power] has been exercised constantly on commerce, navigation, and other delegated powers to the almost entire exclusion of the re served which, from their nature rarely ever come in question between us and other na tions."). The problems with Golove's approach go beyond mere termino logical confusion. Golove's article is itself another example of the very problem I highlighted in my article: defenders of a broad treaty power artificially divide the subject matter issue from the states' rights issue and defend them separately. The principal tensions between the treaty power and American federalism, however, occur when these two ele ments of the nationalist view are combined, because it is this combina tion that would give the treatymakers essentially unlimited power to 28. Moreover, Calhoun actually did believe that there were some (modest) states' rights-related limitations on the treaty power:
[The treatymakers] can enter into no stipulation calculated to change the character of the government; or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making power; or which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of the government, -or the objects for which it was formed. Among which, it seems to be settled, that it cannot change or alter the boundary of a State, -or cede any portion of its territory without its consent. 
II. GOLOVE'S PROPOSED SUBJECT MATIER LIMITATION
As noted above, Golove purports to be accepting a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Indeed, he proclaims that, " [w] ere the President and Senate to make a treaty on a subject inappropriate for negotiation and agreement, and thus beyond the scope of the treaty power, the treaty would be invalid under the Tenth Amendment."37 There is, as Golove acknowledges, substantial historical support for a subject matter limitation. To recite just a few examples, James Madison emphasized during the Virginia ratifying debates that "[t]he object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is external;"38 John Calhoun, as noted above, stated in the mid nineteenth century that the treaty power was "strictly limited to ques tions inter alios; that is, to questions between us and foreign powers which require negotiation to adjust them";39 and Charles Evans Hughes suggested in 1929 that the treaty power was limited to matters of "international concern" and thus might not allow for the regulation of matters "which normally and appropriately were within the local jurisdictions of the States."40 Thus, given Golove's emphasis on his tory, his acceptance of a subj ect matter limitation is not surprising. It turns out, however, that his proposed subj ect matter limitation is premised on a false assumption and, more importantly, lacks any meaningful content. 41 Golove begins by suggesting that the subj ect matter limitation is a nonissue. He contends that, contrary to the claim in my original arti Unfortunately for Golove, the problems with his position only be gin with the mistaken assumption noted above. Not only have others rejected a subject matter limitation, but, upon close inspection, it turns out that Golove's own proposed subject matter limitation lacks any real content. His position, therefore, actually amounts to a rejection of a subj ect matter limitation -the very proposition that he denies any one supports.
Like the Restatement (Third), Golove rejects a subject matter test that would require that treaties address "external" or "international" matters.51 He also rejects limiting the treaty power to the subjects tra ditionally regulated by treaty when the Constitution was ratified.52 In stead, Golove suggests the following subject matter test: the United States can enter into any treaty as long as the treaty is intended to "advance[] the national interests of the United States in its relations with other nations."53 Although offered by Golove as a limitation on the treaty power, it is difficult to see how this test would have any lim iting force at all. If the President and Senate have decided to enter into a treaty with another nation, they presumably are of the view that it "advances the national interests of the United States" in its relations with that nation. And it seems inconceivable that courts would second guess this view, which presumably would require an examination of either the national interests of the United States, the subjective beliefs of the U.S. treatymakers, or both. Indeed, if anything is clear from the Supreme Court's foreign affairs and political question jurisprudence, it is that courts are not to engage in such second-guessing.54 Golove es sentially concedes this point.55 Thus, in truth, Golove's "limitation"
proposed subject matter test. Whereas Golove's test would look to the purpose of the U.S. treatymakers, see infra note 53, the Restatement (Third) says: "States may enter into an agreement on any matter of concern to them, and international law does not look behind their motives or purposes in doing so." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 302 cmt. c.
51.
See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1289-90 (stating that the "international" subject matter requirement is "unjustifiable" and has been "widely rejected").
52. See, e.g., id. at 1291 n.730. 53. Id. at 1090 n.41; see also id. at 1287, 1291 n.730. Golove describes this test as his "own interpretation" of the subject matter limitation on the treaty power. Id. at 1287; see also id. at 1090 n.41 ("I interpret this [subject matter] requirement to mean that the Presi dent and Senate can make any treaty which advances the national interests of the United States in its relations with other nations."). 55. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1095 (acknowledging that "the President and Sen ate have a virtual carte blanche" in determining "the scope of the national interests ... to safeguard and advance through foreign negotiations"); id. at 1262 n.623 (noting the "tradi tional -and continuing -judicial reluctance to second-guess the motives of the political branches, particularly in the field of foreign affairs"); id. at 1292 ("For obvious reasons, [Vol. 99:98 boils down to the proposition that the treaty power encompasses any treaty that the treatymakers decide to conclude.56
This conclusion is confirmed by Golove's discussion of human rights treaties. He repeatedly insists that the civil, political, and other rights of U.S. citizens may be regulated by treaty, notwithstanding his proposed subj ect matter limitation.57 He tells us that the treatymakers could even regulate local criminal punishment -for example, by en tering into a treaty abolishing the death penalty.58 Such measures do not exceed the subj ect matter scope of the treaty power, says Golove, because the treatymakers have decided that human rights issues are important to the United States' international relations.59 This claim may be correct, but it confirms that Golove's approach would allow the treatymakers the ability to conclude agreements on essentially any subject they deem appropriate.
Human rights treaties are in fact a likely (and understandable) rea son for the Restatement (Third) 's rejection of a subject matter limita tion. These treaties regulate the relationship between nations and their own citizens, often on subjects that have historically been consid ered matters of local concern. Moreover, they are not reciprocal in the traditional sense, in that the incentives to comply with them are not substantially dependent on other nations' compliance.60 This latter point has been emphasized in the decisions of a number of interna tional institutions. The International Court of Justice has stated that, with human rights treaties, "one cannot speak of individual advan tages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. "61 Similarly, the Hu man Rights Committee for the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has stated that human rights treaties "are not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations" and that the "principle of courts do not feel free to second-guess the political branches on whether a treaty furthers our foreign policy interests.").
56. Like most commentators, Golove would require that there be an actual agreement between nations rather than a "mock marriage." See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41. But, as others have noted, that is not a subject matter limitation. See Henkin, supra note 45, at 274 (stating that the mock treaty limitation "does not suggest any limitations as to the subject matter of treaties").
57. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1090 n.41, 1205 n.420, 1302-03 n.771. 58. Id. at 1078, 1298 n.756. Golove states that such a death penalty treaty "could plausi bly be attacked as an abuse of the treaty power," but that, because it would "serve a foreign policy purpose," it would "thus be constitutional." Id. at 1298 n.756. inter-State reciprocity has no place" in this context.62 Regional inter national institutions have made similar observations.63
If the U.S. treaty power were limited to "international" or "exter nal" matters, or to truly reciprocal arrangements, human rights trea ties might be suspect. Indeed, this is precisely what a committee of the American Bar Association argued in a widely-discussed 1967 report.64 As a result, Professor Henkin, before becoming Chief Reporter for the Restatement (Third), famously challenged such subject matter limi tations, expressing concern that they might be interpreted in a way that would undermine U.S. ability to enter into human rights treaties.65
And the Restatement (Third) expressly refers to this issue in explaining its rejection of a subject matter limitation, noting that "[e ]arly argu ments that the United States may not adhere to international human rights agreements because they deal with matters of strictly domestic concern were later abandoned."66 Golove appears to be unaware of this recent history.67 In any event, his position, fairly read, is quite 62. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 67. Despite insisting that human rights are proper subjects for the treaty power, Golove asserts at times that treaties must involve mutuality and reciprocity. See (1999) . According to Golove, White "seems fundamentally to misunderstand the purpose of treaties," which, says Golove, con cern "tragedy of the commons" problems that cannot be solved by unilateral acts. Golove, supra note 2, at 1259 n.624. It is Golove, however, who seems to "fundamentally misunder stand" the nature of human rights treaties, since those treaties do not, in fact, concern trag edy of the commons problems. The United States still has strong incentives to protect the human rights of its citizens even if China, for example, fails to do the same. Golove also errs [Vol. 99:98 similar to Henkin's and the Restatement (Third)'s -that is, he rejects any meaningful subject matter limitation.
Ultimately, Golove ends up retreating to a pure political process limitation on the treaty power, saying that the "remedy for abuse" of the treaty power "lies ultimately in the people and not the courts."68 I criticized this political process argument at length in my original arti cle,69 and I do not wish to repeat the criticisms here. Instead, I will simply make two general observations. First, even with their require ment of two-thirds senatorial consent, there are some ways in which treaties may be less amenable to the political process argument than domestic legislation. In particular, the negotiation and drafting of trea ties is dominated by the Executive Branch, which is not particularly representative of state interests; the treaty process tends to be more opaque, and therefore potentially less open to democratic inputs, than federal legislation; and treaty commitments -particularly in modern, multilateral treaties -are often vague and aspirational, such that their precise consequences, including their consequences for state in terests, may become evident only after ratification.70 Golove does not address any of these aspects of treatymaking.
Second, the two-thirds senatorial consent requirement does not even apply to executive agreements, which constitute the vast majority of international agreements concluded in recent years by the United States. Golove's only response to this point is to assert that, unlike treaties, executive agreements are not immune from federalism limita tions.71 He provides no explanation for this assertion, and many of the nationalist commentators he defends have asserted otherwise. In par ticular, these commentators have claimed that "congressional executive agreements" (executive agreements approved before or af ter the fact by Congress) are completely interchangeable with treaties and thus can be concluded whenever a treaty could be concluded.72 in asserting that "[t)reaties and legislation are of essentially different characters, and to equate them is to make a category mistake of the first magnitude." Id. at 1093. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, self-executing treaties ratified by the United States have the status of federal legislation. This distinguishes the treaty power from other Article II powers, such as the power to receive and appoint ambassadors. Moreover, under the well-settled "last-in time" rule, treaties are accorded essentially the same domestic law status as federal legisla tion. Bradley, supra note 1, at 457. Golove's categorical distinction also fails to take account of modem multilateral treaties, many of which resemble and are designed to operate like domestic legislation. Id 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 303 cmt. e ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in Golove himself has asserted the same proposition in prior writings.73 Indeed, in his article with Professor Ackerman, Golove specifically claimed (like the Restatement (Third)) that congressional-executive agreements are now interchangeable even fo r purposes of fe deralism limitations. He explained that, at first, the immunity from federalism limitations allowed in Holland was thought to apply only to Article II treaties, rendering congressional-executive agreements "constitution ally inferior to treaties."74 Through a World War II period constitu tional transformation, however, Golove argued that congressional executive agreements became fully interchangeable with Article II treaties.75 Whatever the justification, the conventional wisdom is that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are interchangeable, which makes the political process argument even more problematic.
Ill. S UPREME C OURT ' S F EDERALISM D ECISIONS
One reason why the scope of the treaty power has become more important in recent years is that the Supreme Court has revitalized federalism restraints on the national government's power in the do mestic arena. This revitalization has taken a variety of forms. Most no tably, the Court has limited the reach of Congress's powers under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment;76 prohibited Congress from "commandeering" state governments in various ways;77 and bolstered state sovereign immunity in both federal and state every instance." (emphasis added)); id. § 302 cmt. d (" [T] he Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements." (emphasis added)); HENKIN, supra note 5, at 217 (stating that the congressional-executive agreement "is a complete alternative to a treaty"). The "commandeering" decisions are only one strand of the Su preme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. The Court also has imposed limits on the subject matter scope of Congress's delegated powers -in particular, Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the Court has emphasized the limited and enumerated powers structure of by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution."). brought together all three strands of the Court's federalism jurispru dence. All of these strands, the Court explained, concern the protec tion of a system of "dual sovereignty," pursuant to which states have the dignity and authority of sovereigns. The Court stated: "Although the Constitution grants broad powers to Congress, our federalism re quires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."121 The Court thus denied that its federalism jurispru dence was sharply divided in the way that Golove suggests.122 In other 116. Id . 9, 2001 ). In that decision, the Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers had improperly construed a provision in the Clean Water Act as confer ring federal authority over isolated, intrastate bodies of water that are used as habitats by migratory birds. Id. at *7. That construction of the Act, the Court reasoned, would "raise significant constitutional questions." Id. at *25. The Court noted that it was reaching this conclusion notwithstanding the statement in Missouri v. Holland that the protection of mi gratory birds is a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude." Id. 125. Contrast this with the more defensible approach by Professor Martin Flaherty, who argues that the same scrutiny that I applied in my original article against the nationalist view should be applied to question the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence. Flaherty, supra note 10.
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power. Nowhere in his article, however, does Golove identify his con stitutional methodology. The reader is left to wonder whether Golove is advocating a strictly originalist approach to the treaty power ques tion or something else. It is difficult to evaluate Golove's claims and criticisms, however, without knowing his methodological frame of ref erence. To take one example, Golove asserts that the proposal I set forth at the end of my original article (that the treatymakers' power to make supreme federal law should be limite.d to the scope of Con gress's powers to make supreme federal law) is "entirely extraconstitu tional in nature."126 An evaluation of that charge, however, would re quire some sense of what Golove believes is "constitutional in nature."
There are suggestions in Golove's article that he assumes that I am an advocate of strict originalism. He declares, as if it were an answer to my article, that "Missouri is an originalist decision."127 He also ac cuses me of inconsistency, and even "sleight of hand, " because I pre sented historical support for a subj ect matter limitation on the treaty power but then ultimately argued against such a limitation.128 It is not clear to me why Golove would have assumed I was a strict originalist. As I explained in my prior article, the principal purpose of my histori cal discussion was to rebut strong clairp.s made by proponents of the nationalist view, not to present an originalist argument for a limited treaty power.129 Indeed, the proposal I set forth at the end of my arti cle was presented as distinctly nonoriginalist. As I explained, given changes in the scope of Congress's legislative powers and in the scope and nature of U.S. treatymaking, "the answer to this question [about how federalism should be protected in the treaty context] may be dif ferent today than it would have been in the past."130 If Golove is himself advocating strict originalism, then there is a substantial contradiction in his analysis. As discussed above, Golove purports to favor a subject matter limitation on the treaty power. He rejects, however, an originalist subject matter limitation -one that would limit the treaty power to "international," "external," or "tradi tionally negotiated" matters. Instead, he proffers a "national interests" test, which, as explained above, amounts to essentially no limitation at 126. Golove, supra note 2, at 1310; see also id. at 1279 (describing my proposal as "en tirely without support in the Constitution").
127. Id. at 1101; see also id. at 1081 ("Contrary to the speculations of even some of Holmes's most sensitive interpreters, the opinion ultimately rests on standard constitutional premises (text, structure, precedent, and history) -indeed, originalist premises -not on an extraordinary theory of inherent foreign affairs powers or even on a view of the Constitution as an evolving or living text." (emphasis added)). In fact, given that the Court in Holland did not even refer to the Founding materials, Golove is being quite creative in describing it as an originalist decision. all. Yet Golove never explains why it is proper to adopt an originalist position with respect to states' rights limitations on the treaty power (assuming he is right about the Founding history) and rej ect an origi nalist position with respect to subj ect matter limitations on the treaty power. He does suggest that a strict subj ect matter limitation would deprive the treatymakers of needed flexibility in this age of globaliza tion.131 Although that may be a strong functional argument, it is hardly an originalist one.
There is, of course, more than one type of originalism.132 Some originalists insist that contemporary constitutional interpretation should replicate the precise understandings at the time of the Found ing; this is what I am calling "strict originalism." This version of origi nalism is probably most famously associated with former Judge Bork.133 Others argue that those understandings should be "trans lated" to take account of contemporary conditions. The most famous proponent of this version of originalism, at least in recent years, is Pro fessor Lawrence Lessig.134 Still others argue that there have been mul tiple "Foundings," each of which has changed the meaning of the Con stitution. The most famous proponent of this version of originalism is Professor Bruce Ackerman.135 In prior writings, Golove }ias advocated the last type of originalism, which, to borrow a phrase from Ackerman, could be called "constitutional moments" originalism. 136 Golove does not appear to be relying on constitutional moments originalism in his response to my article, perhaps because he believes that some other constitutional theory is sufficient for his purposes. In terestingly, though, there is a plausible argument that constitutional moments originalism leads to a conclusion contrary to Golove's posi tion. As Professor Peter Spiro has argued, there have been a number of events since World War II that are similar to the events that Golove has in other writings found sufficient to amend the Constitution.137 Here is a brief summary of these events:
131. Golove, supra note 2, at 1092 n.45. Before World War II, international law regulated primarily inter actions among nations and did not contain extensive individual rights protectionsP8 Soon after the War, with the experience of the Holocaust and other atrocities fresh in mind, the international com munity began to develop a comprehensive body of international hu man rights law. The seeds of this law were planted in the 1940s. The United Nations Charter, which came into force in 1945, contained general commitments to protect human rights.139 Three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and opened it for national ratifications. That same year, the General Assembly issued its non binding but nonetheless influential Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contains broadly worded civil, political, economic, so cial, and cultural rights.140 Immediately following the passage of the Declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights began drafting a human rights covenant aimed at converting the nonbinding provisions of the Declaration into binding treaty obligations. This pro cess eventually led to the promulgation of a number of human rights treaties, including the wide-ranging International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.141 As many international law scholars have noted, the emergence of this human rights law regime constituted a truly revolutionary change in both the nature and scope of international law.142 139. U. N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3 (stating that one of the purposes of the United Na tions is to "promot[e) and encourag[e) respect for human rights and for fundamental free doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); id. art. 55 (stating that the United Nations "shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); id. art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the (United Nations) Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Ar ticle 55."). [Vol. 99:98 United States officials played a prominent role in initiating this in ternational human rights law regime. Nonetheless, in the 1950s there were intense debates in the United States over whether and to what extent the nation should participate in the regime. The principal sub jects of debate were the domestic implications of ratifying interna tional human rights treaties, including the implications for American federalism. As part of these debates, there were numerous proposals to amend the Constitution in order to limit the treaty power.143 Along with leaders of the American Bar Association, a key proponent of such an amendment was Senator John Bricker of Ohio, and the vari ous proposed amendments are commonly referred to jointly as the "Bricker Amendment."144 In general, the proposed amendments were intended to preclude treaties from being self-executing and to make clear that treaties would not override the reserved powers of the states.145 Some versions also would have restricted the use of executive agreements.146 One of the proposed amendments fell only one vote short of obtaining the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.147
To help defeat the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower admini stration made repeated commitments that it would not use the treaty power in a way that would infringe on state prerogatives. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reassured the Senate in 1953 that the admini stration was "committed to the exercise of the treatymaking power only within traditional limits" and that he did not believe "that treaties should, or lawfully can, be used as a device to circumvent the constitu tional procedures established in relation to what are essentially mat ters of domestic concern."148 In 1955, Dulles further stated that the administration recognized that the treaty power could not properly be used for matters "which do not essentially affect the actions of nations in relation to international affairs, but are purely internal. [Vol. 99:98 application to the present issue. Even more strangely, given his writ ings, Golove strongly criticizes me for proposing that Holland should be limited or overruled, observing that if my proposal were accepted there would be constitutional change "without all the effort" of a for mal Article V amendment -the very thing advocated by constitu tional moments originalism.156 Of course, Golove's criticism is off the mark in any event, since a constitutional amendment is not needed in order to reassess a Supreme Court decision. But the criticism further highlights the methodological uncertainties underlying Golove's analysis.
B. Law Office History?
Whatever his constitutional methodology, it is clear that Golove is attempting to avoid the "law office history" charge made against many legal academics who base their arguments on history.157 To his credit, Golove has read and considered a vast array of primary and secondary materials, and his article is, as a result, very rich in detail. In addition, he does an admirable job of situating some of the debates over the scope of the treaty power within their historical context. Inattention to detail and context, however, are not the only elements of the law of fice history charge. A central complaint about the use of history by le gal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and twisted in order to support a particular conclusion. It is in this sense that, notwithstanding its length, Golove's historical discussion may be considered law office history.
Although there is much of interest in Golove's historical discus sion, there is also a noticeable one-sidedness to the discussion. There are many manifestations of this. Almost invariably, the historical ma terials that contradict Golove's conclusion are relegated to footnotes, frequently with a statement that goes something like this: "Unsur prisingly, Professor Bradley relies on this piece of evidence."158 When Golove encounters statements by officials that support limits on the treaty power, he often asserts that these statements must have been 156. Golove, supra note 2, at 1312. I should make clear that I am not myself a proponent of constitutional moments originalism, in part because the theory appears to me to be too manipulable, with proponents of this theory finding only the constitutional moments that they like. 158. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 2, at 1149 n.22, 1205 n.421, 1225 n.499, 1234 n.528. merely tactical or disingenuous, while accepting statements to the con trary (sometimes by the same officials) at face value.159 In addition, Golove frequently attaches his own pejorative labels to anyone who has argued for limits on the treaty power. For example, he states that the citizens of South Carolina were not engaging in "[r]ational discus sion" when they disagreed with the views of one Supreme Court Jus tice {William Johnson) concerning the scope of the treaty power;160 re fers to arguments for restrictions on the treaty power as "states' rights dogmas";161 and says that efforts in the 1950s to limit the treaty power by constitutional amendment (efforts that received the support of the American Bar Association and many Senators) were "shameful" and involved "virtual fanatics."162 Similarly, Golove often attempts a guilt by-association strategy, suggesting linkages {often no more than tem poral) between arguments for a limited treaty power and pernicious practices such as slavery and racial segregation. 163 Golove is also opportunistic in his use of sources. The reliability of sources in his article often seems to depend on whether they support his views. To take a few examples, he dismisses Madison's construc tion of the treaty power during the Articles of Confederation period, saying that it "would have seriously undermined Congress's ability to conduct foreign policy;"164 relies on what he perceives to be helpful statements from Madison during the ratification period;165 and dis avows Madison's view of the treaty power during the Jay Treaty de bates, suggesting (without much evidence) that Madison was acting as an unwilling front-man for Jefferson.166 Similarly, Golove relies on Jefferson's views during the Articles of Confederation period as sup port for the nationalist view and refers to his "heroic exertions,"167 dis avows the views of "the irrepressible Jefferson" during the Jay Treaty debate as reflecting "a legendary hostility to the treaty power,"168 and relies on Jefferson's views and actions as President. Another problem with Golove's treatment of history is that he of ten focuses on the treaty power issue in isolation from debates and un certainties concerning the supremacy of federal law and the scope of other national powers. For example, Golove presents evidence that the Continental Congress entered into treaties beyond its legislative powers, while downplaying the fact that it was unclear during the Ar ticles of Confederation period whether treaties had the status of su preme federal law.173 As discussed above, however, it is the creation of domestic federal law beyond Congress's powers that is the ultimate is sue in contemporary debates over the scope of the treaty power. In any event, the scope of the national government's legislative powers were uncertain during the Articles of Confederation period, such that it was not always clear whether treaties were in fact exceeding those powers. Thus, for example, John Jay reasoned in 1786 that the debts provision in the treaty of peace with Great Britain did not infringe on the rights of states because the power to confiscate wartime debts rested exclusively with the national government.174 Golove disagrees with Jay's reasoning,175 but the key point is not whether Jay was right or wrong but that there were uncertainties about the scope of state and national powers, making it unclear whether the treaties were in fact infringing on states' rights.
Similarly, Golove repeatedly relies on treaties granting property rights to alien citizens as proof that the treaty power has historically exceeded Congress's legislative powers, but nowhere in his article does he conclusively show that, after the Constitution was ratified, Congress possessed no power to regulate the property rights of alien citizens. On the contrary, there are repeated hints in Golove's article that this and related issues of congressional power were uncertain and contested throughout the nineteenth century.176 Despite these hints, and despite the generally exhaustive nature of Golove's historical nar-170. Id rative, Golove does not pursue the issue.177 A similar omission occurs in connection with Golove's discussion of South Carolina's Negro Seamen's Act.178 Although Golove describes the legal controversy over that Act as if it were primarily focused on the scope of the treaty power, it was in fact primarily focused on the scope of the foreign commerce power, and the materials Golove relies on often invoke Congress's commerce power as the primary basis for invalidating the Act. Justice Johnson did so, for example, in his circuit decision in Elkison v. Deliesseline,119 yet Golove unhesitatingly describes him as "invoking the nationalist conception of the treaty power."180 Similarly, Golove relies on an opinion on this issue by Attorney General William Wirt as support for the nationalist view,181 even though the opinion re lies primarily on the commerce power. 182 Golove states that it "seems safe to assume" that Wirt intended his reference to the treaty power to be separate and independent from the commerce power discussion,183 but this is questionable in light of the fact that (as Golove notes) Wirt had earlier written an opinion clearly rej ecting the nationalist view of the treaty power. 184 Finally, Golove's description of the historical materials is often ex aggerated. For example, he asserts that "states' rights limitations, though sometimes invoked, were uniformly defeated under the [Arti cles of] Confederation."185 In fact, there were serious states' rights ob jections raised against a number of treaties and treaty provisions dur ing this period. These obj ections were raised by prominent officials, including John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and James Madison, and they led to the delay or nonratification of some treaties, the limitation of others, and the nonenforcement by and against the states of still others.186 Even the important Treaty of Peace with Great [Vol. 99:98 Britain encountered significant states' rights objections. American of ficials maintained, for example, that the Continental Congress lacked the power to agree to a proposed article in that treaty addressing the issue of confiscated British estates.187 As a result, Congress ultimately agreed in the treaty only to recommend to the states that confiscated estates be restored.188 It was events such as these that Alexander Hamilton presumably had in mind when he stated in Th e Federalist that the lack of a commerce power under the Articles of Confedera tion "has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial trea ties with foreign powers." 189 Golove also asserts that, during the Founding period, concerns re garding the scope of the treaty power produced only suggestions re lating to the process for making treaties and did not produce any sug gestions for limiting the substantive scope of the treaty power. "At no point," says Golove, "did concern over the interests of the states lead is a matter evidently appertaining to the internal polity of the separate States, the Congress, by the nature of our constitution, have no authority to interfere with it."). Golove asserts that the American officials were disingenuous in making this claim. The only evidence he offers for this assertion is that the officials ultimately agreed to treaty provisions that appeared to conflict with their claim. See Golove, supra note 2, at 1117-20. There is a difference, how ever, between insincerity and compromise. to proposals to restrict the scope of the treaty power."190 In fact, this concern led to a number of proposals for clarifying or limiting the scope of the treaty power. For example, the New York resolution of ratification stated that New York was ratifying the Constitution on the understanding that "no treaty ought to operate so as to alter the con stitution of any state; nor ought any commercial treaty to operate so as to abrogate any law of the United States.''191 A different proposal came from the Virginia and North Carolina conventions. They pro posed in their resolutions of ratification that the Constitution be amended to make clear that "no treaty ceding, contracting, restrain ing, or suspending, the territorial rights or claims of the United States, or any of them, or their, or any of their rights or claims to fishing in the American seas, or navigating the American rivers, shall be made, but in cases of the most urgent and extreme necessity."192 And Pennsylvania proposed that "no treaty ... shall be deemed or con strued to alter or affect any law of the United States, or of any par ticular state, until such treaty shall have been laid before and assented to by the House of Representatives in Congress," and that treaties shall not be valid if "contradictory to the Constitution of the United States, or the constitutions of the individual states." 193 Golove's claim that the Anti-Federalist charges regarding the po tentially unbounded nature of the treaty power were "met with acqui escence, not denial"194 also overstates (or at least confuses) matters. Golove makes that claim when discussing the Federal Convention. In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, however, which had the most ex tended debates over the scope of the treaty power, the Federalists strongly disputed the Anti-Federalist charges. George Nicholas ar gued, for example, that the treatymakers could "make no treaty which shall be repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution, or inconsistent with [Vol. 99:98 the delegated powers."195 Edmund Randolph contended that "neither the life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular right of any State, can be affected by a treaty."196 And James Madison explained that " [t] he exercise of the [treaty] power must be consistent with the object of the delegation" and that "[t]he obj ect of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and is extemal."197 The "external" nature of treaties was crucial, Madison emphasized, because when ad dressing such matters, the treatymakers "will feel the whole force of national attachment to their country."198 In light of these statements, as well as the proposed constitutional amendments and clarifications described above, it is difficult to understand the basis for Go love's as sertion that "there is only one statement ... in the whole debate over the Constitution -that even arguably supports the states' rights view."199
Golove also overstates the degree to which Supreme Court prece dent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland. Most of the de cisions Golove cites as "affirming the nationalist view" simply held that valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.200 Others failed to address the constitutional relationship between treaties and state law 195. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1389 (emphasis added). Golove contends that Nicholas was just invoking the standard Federalist argument about why there was no need for a Bill of Rights, Golove, supra note 2, at 1148, but this misses the point. The standard Federalist argument was that there was no need for a Bill of Rights because the powers delegated to the national government were sufficiently limited in scope that they would not give the national government the ability to take actions that would infringe on individual rights. Bradley, supra note 1, at 412 & n.124. By applying that argument to the treaty power, Nicholas was making clear that the Treaty Clause did not give the national government the ability to create preemptive federal law beyond the scope of its delegated legislative powers (and thus potentially infringe on individual rights). Nicholas had made a similar argument earlier in the debate about the Necessary and Proper Clause. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITIJTION 1135 (John A. Kaminski & Gaspere J. Saladino eds., 1990).
196. 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1385 (emphasis added). In quoting Randolph's statement in the text of his article, Golove places an ellipsis in place of the refer ence to the rights of states, and relegates that reference to a footnote. Golove, supra note 2, at 1147. In the footnote, Golove contends that Randolph was just referring to the issue of whether a treaty could cede state territory, id. at 1147 n.216, but neither Randolph's state ment, nor the statement by Patrick Henry to which he was responding, was limited to that issue. See, e.g., 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 1384-85 (statement by Patrick Henry) ("The Constitutions of these States may be most flagrantly violated without rem edy.").
197. Id. at 1396.
198.
Id. If Golove were correct in suggesting that the Anti-Federalist charges accurately reflected the scope of the treaty power, it would mean that the treaty power would not be subject to any constitutional limitations, since that was one of their charges. See Bradley, su pra note 1, at 413. But Golove rightly rejects such a construction.
199. Golove, supra note 2, at 1147. Golove is referring to the statement by George Nicholas, quoted above. It is also inaccurate to suggest, as Golove does, that the only period of American history in which there has been substantial support for states' rights limitations on the treaty power was the period shortly be fore the Civil War, and that this support largely evaporated after the War. 206 In fact, although the weight of academic commentary may have come to support a treaty power unrestricted by states' rights prior to Holland,207 there were repeated commitments to the states' rights view by U. S. officials all the way up to (and even after) the Holland decision. For example, in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to en-
